



# **Applying Space Safety Methodology to Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Risk Assessments**

*Lessons Learned*

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# Discussion Topics

- Public risk drivers
- Space Launch Vehicle vs. UAV Risk Modeling
  - Failure histories
  - Debris Properties
  - Affected population
  - Failure response modes
  - Impact dispersion
  - Trajectories and flight paths
- Estimating and presenting public risk for UAVs



# Public Risk Drivers

## *Primary*

- Mission failure probability
- Debris
  - Debris lists
  - Probability of occurrence
  - Casualty area
- Population density

## *Secondary*

- Failure response modes
- Impact dispersion
- Flight path



# Space Launch vs. UAV Risk Modeling

## *Mission Failure Probability ( $P_f$ )*

### *Space Launch*

- Slow launch rate causes slow changes to  $P_f$
- Typically a small dataset from which to derive statistically valid estimates
- Each launch has an updated  $P_f$

### *UAV*

- Due to high rate of flight hours gathered and multiple mishaps,  $P_f$  changes daily
- Extensive flight data results in the  $P_f$  reaching equilibrium quickly
- Establish a schedule on which to update  $P_f$  for analysis purposes

***Risk analyses must allow for constantly changing  $P_f$  values***



# Space Launch vs. UAV Risk Modeling

## *Debris Properties*

### *Space Launch*

- Many debris lists
  - Engine or fuel tank explosion
  - Aerodynamic breakup
  - Flight termination system
  - Intact impact
- Debris tends to be small tank, structure, or electronic fragments
- Few fragments will experience a high degree of lift

### *UAV*

- Large majority of UAV failures are from intact impacts with a high number of secondary fragments
- In-flight breakup scenarios generate small number of high lift fragments

***Fragment number vs. vehicle weight charts used in space launch analyses cannot be used for UAVs***



# Space Launch vs. UAV Risk Modeling

## *Population Density*

### *Space Launch*

- Detailed launch area population density is available for space launch sites
- Global population models are used successfully for overflight risk assessments

### *UAV*



- Requires detailed population model for each airfield to properly assess risk
- APT devised a method of creating a hyper-local population model without detailed site assessments
- Sensitive locations (schools, hospitals) must be identified

***Detailed launch area data is too time consuming to generate and global data is too granular***



# Space Launch vs. UAV Risk Modeling

## *Population Density*



*Cecil Airfield, Jacksonville, Florida*



# Space Launch vs. UAV Risk Modeling

## *Failure Response Modes*

### *Space Launch*

- Mode 1: Vehicle topples over or falls back on the launch point after a rise of, at most, a few feet
- Mode 2: Vehicle loses control immediately or shortly after liftoff, with all flight directions equally likely
- Mode 3: Vehicle fails to pitch-program normally, producing near-vertical flight

### *UAV*

- Mode 1: Vehicle explodes at throttle up for takeoff after movement of, at most, a few feet
- Mode 2: Vehicle loses control immediately or shortly after throttle up for takeoff. The vehicle will either skid to a stop or impact an obstruction and explode after impact.
- Mode 3: Vehicle either fails to climb or impacts the ground shortly after takeoff





# Space Launch vs. UAV Risk Modeling

## *Failure Response Modes*

### *Space Launch*

- Mode 4: Vehicle flies within normal limits until some malfunction terminates thrust, causes spontaneous breakup, or produces a rapid tumble that results in immediate destruct action
- Mode 5: Vehicle may impact in any direction from the launch point within its range capability
- Mode 6: Normal flights and normal impacts of separated stages and components

### *UAV*

- Mode 4: Vehicle flies within normal limits until some malfunction causes loss of stability, causes spontaneous breakup, or causes the vehicle to explode
- Mode 5: Vehicle may impact in any direction within its flight range capability
- Mode 6: Successful mission, normal impacts of separated stages and components (where applicable), and failures that lead to successfully executed abort events



# Space Launch vs. UAV Risk Modeling

## *Impact Dispersion*

### *Space Launch*

- No control of the vehicle after experiencing a failure (except FTS when applicable)
- Severe breakup events or an intact impact produces a well defined impact dispersion
- Variability in debris propagation can be accounted for

### *UAV*


- Lifting properties of the intact vehicle or major components cause major dispersion
- Impact dispersion along the flight path resembles a cardioid
- Possible fly-away events
- Pilots-in-the-loop

***Impact dispersion is a complicated function of impacts beneath the flight path, impacts around ditch points, and pilot flight tendencies***



# Space Launch vs. UAV Risk Modeling

## *Impact Dispersion*



*Raw cardioid impact pattern for a sample UAV*



# Space Launch vs. UAV Risk Modeling

## *Flight Path*

### *Space Launch*

- Programmed to follow a very precise trajectory
- Guidance system controls flight
- Deviation beyond the standard three-sigma dispersion can still be modeled with little uncertainty

### *UAV*

- Flights based on waypoints
- Flight controlled partially or completely by remote pilots
- Significant flight path uncertainty is introduced as soon as a pilot takes control following a failure

***The variability in actual UAV flight paths adds difficulty in estimating public risk***



## Conclusion

- Although there are distinct differences between space launch vehicles and UAVs, current space risk methodology can be applied to UAV flights
- Extreme care must be taken in modeling UAV
  - Debris properties
  - Impact dispersion
  - Nominal and off-nominal flight paths
- The space safety community can provide reviewed and accepted processes and tools for public risk estimation
- UAV programs can also benefit from risk mitigation techniques employed in the space safety community



# Questions and Discussion

