

# Uncertainty in Risk to Aircraft From Space Vehicle Operations

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## Acknowledgements

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- ▶ Dr. Paul Wilde provided technical direction by the FAA, and we gratefully acknowledge his comments during the development of this paper, and for presenting it for us, as we were unable to attend.

## Background

- ▶ Space vehicle accidents can generate lots of debris, initiating above aircraft altitudes
- ▶ Aircraft, due to their speed and thin skin, may be vulnerable to smaller debris than objects on the ground
- ▶ Space vehicle launches and re-entries sometimes necessitate significant mitigations of risk
- ▶ The relationship between uncertainties in the inputs to the risk calculation and the resulting risk measures has not been previously evaluated quantitatively

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## Aircraft risk measures

- ▶ Probability of
  - Impact above certain mass threshold
  - Potentially casualty-producing impact
  - Potentially catastrophic impact
- ▶ Calculated for either
  - An aircraft flying a particular trajectory
    - A four-dimensional calculation, since aircraft is moving and debris is falling
    - Useful for assessing a mission support aircraft
    - Can be used to evaluate a flight path, but requires aircraft flying at different times
  - A particular location (approximation)
    - Aircraft flies straight and level the entire time debris is in the air
    - Aircraft stays at the same position, but has a forward speed
    - Useful for developing keep-out areas

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## Uncertainties in Risk Calculation Inputs

- ▶ Debris resulting from the accident
  - Number of fragments
  - Fragment masses
  - Break-up induced velocity
- ▶ Probability of failure
- ▶ Aircraft characteristics: size, speed, etc.
- ▶ Aircraft vulnerability model
  - RCC 321-07 contains models of casualty and catastrophe area for commercial jets as a function of fragment mass

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## Approach


- ▶ Develop input datasets that are samples from the range of uncertainty
- ▶ Compute risk measures for a sample mission, with variants representing sampled inputs
- ▶ Evaluate resulting uncertainties
  - How large is the uncertainty in aircraft risk?
  - What input uncertainties are most important?

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## Input uncertainty: fragment list

- Method to produce samples
  - Start with nominal fragment list that has reasonable representation of small fragments
  - Scale the number of fragments up or down, and the breakup induced velocity
    - Scaling factor is larger at smaller masses
    - Scaling factor is randomly sampled once for whole debris and once for each fragment group
  - Adjust fragment mass to conserve total vehicle mass




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## Input uncertainty: vulnerability

- Used RCC 321-10 commercial jet casualty model as baseline
- Apply scaling factors to the mass
  - Bias: factor of two
  - One-sigma: 50%



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## Other input uncertainties

Parameter	Mean	Standard deviation
Speed (km/hr)	830	48
Altitude (m)	11,000	610
Area (m <sup>2</sup> )	Top: 1000 Front: 140	5%



Failure probability uncertainty was not modeled; risk measures are directly proportional to failure probability

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## Mission

- Realistic LEO nominal trajectory for two stage vehicle
- Hypothetical launch location and azimuth




PCPI: Probability of Casualty Producing Impact

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## Results: Baseline vs azimuth




- Chart shows maximum risk over all planes flying at each azimuth, crossing the IIP trace at different times
- Risks vary by azimuth of crossing by a little less than a factor of two

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## Statistics of risks for input variants

Azimuth	Mean	Std. dev.	COV (%)
0	0.55	0.10	18%
30	0.69	0.14	20%
60	0.69	0.13	18%
90	0.77	0.15	19%
120	0.67	0.13	19%
150	0.56	0.10	18%
180	0.52	0.09	18%
210	0.54	0.10	18%
240	0.64	0.12	19%
270	0.85	0.18	21%
300	0.69	0.14	20%
330	0.57	0.11	19%



PCPI: Probability of Casualty Producing Impact

- Variant statistics are consistent at all azimuth: given input uncertainties, coefficient of variation in risk is ~20%
- Looking only at maximum azimuth, risk uncertainty appears to follow a log-normal distribution

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## Sensitivity of output risk to input uncertainty

Baseline PCPI: 0.95 (per million)

Parameter (% change)	PCPI when Increased	PCPI when Decreased
Speed (7%)	0.96	0.93
Altitude (20%)	0.89	0.90
Area (25%)	1.10	0.78
Vuln. Model (100%)	1.00	0.85
Fragments (100%)	1.00	0.77


- ▶ The aircraft area uncertainty is most important, followed by the fragment list uncertainty
- ▶ Raising or lowering altitude both reduced risk

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## Comparison of uncertainty to different aircraft

- ▶ Boeing 737 is three times smaller than 747.
- ▶ Maximum PCPI for Boeing 737 with baseline models is 0.4 (vice 0.95).
- ▶ This is much larger than uncertainties resulting from input uncertainties.

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## Conclusions

- ▶ The size of the aircraft resulted in a greater effect on the resulting risk than any of the uncertainty in the computation.
- ▶ The variation of risk as a function of the azimuth of crossing the risk region is also greater than the uncertainty at a given azimuth.
- ▶ Caveat: uncertainties in inputs are highly speculative

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